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Why Keep the Provocation Defense?: Some
Reflections on a Difficult Subject
Joshua Dresslert
I wrote my first article on provocation law more than2
twenty years ago. 1 I have never lost my interest in the subject.
My original goal was to make sense of a doctrine that, at once,
seemed to suggest that provoked killings are partially justified
and partially excusable. 3 Since then, my understanding of the
provocation defense 4 has changed a bit,5 but until recently I
t Frank R. Strong Chair in Law, Michael E. Moritz College of Law, The
Ohio State University. I thank Mitchell Berman, Deborah Denno, Stephen
Garvey, Stuart Green, Sandy Kadish, John Monahan, Herbert Morris, Marc
Spindelman, Carol Steiker, Scott Sundby, George Thomas, Lloyd Weinreb, and
Peter Westen for their help on earlier drafts of this Essay. Of course, all remaining errors are my own. Nathan DeDino provided excellent research assistance for which I am deeply grateful. Copyright 2002 by Joshua Dressler
and the Minnesota Law Review Foundation.
1. Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion:A Defense in Search of a
Rationale, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421, 439-41 (1982) [hereinafter
Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion].
2. My other articles on the topic are Joshua Dressler, Provocation:Partial Justificationor PartialExcuse, 51 MOD. L. REV. 467 (1988), and Joshua
Dressler, When "Heterosexual"Men Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections on
ProvocationLaw, Sexual Advances, and the "ReasonableMan" Standard,85 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 726 (1995) [hereinafter Dressier, "Heterosexual"
Men].
3. Readers still not sensitive to the distinction betveen justification and
excuse defenses may find a brief primer of use. E.g., Joshua Dressler, Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature, 33
WAYNE L. REV. 1155, 1161-67 (1987).
4. Provocation is a full defense in the sense that it ordinarily results in
acquittal of the crime of murder. It is a partial defense in the sense that,
unlike defenses such as self-protection, the actor is convicted of some offense,
albeit a lesser one than murder. See infra note 8. I will use the terms "defense" and "partial defense" interchangeably in this Essay.
5. Provocation law is all about emotions, most notably anger. In my
early work I thought of anger as, at most, an excusable response to provocation. Upon further reflection and the scholarship of others, see, e.g., Jeffrie G.
Murphy & Jean Hampton, FORGIVENESS AND MERCY 16-19, 43-60 (1988); Andrew von Hirsch & Nils Jareborg, Provocation and Culpability, in
RESPONSIBILITY, CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL
PSYCHOLOGY 241, 248-51 (Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987), I came to conclude
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never found reason to question the basic wisdom of the defense.
Original heat-of-passion law was narrow. 6 In 1962, the
drafters of the Model Penal Code provided a new, far broader
vision of the defense. 7 The primary issue thereafter seemed to
be how far state law would move in the direction of the Code.
There was little or no doubt that some version of the provocation doctrine would continue to be recognized.
Today, however, provocation law is under attack. Of
course, one might expect law-and-order advocates to criticize a
doctrine that can permit an intentional killer to avoid conviction for murder.8 One can argue that the statutory sentencing
differences between manslaughter and murder are too great or
too small, but the point is that critics of the defense can hardly
that anger could also be characterized as justifiable. Dressier, "Heterosexual"
Men, supranote 2, at 745-49.
6. See Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion,supra note 1, at 428.
7. See infra Part VA.
8. Typically, heat-of-passion homicide constitutes manslaughter. In Illinois, however, heat-of-passion homicide constitutes second-degree murder.
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/9-2(a)(1) (West 1993). In Colorado, a knowing
killing, including one committed as the result of provocation, is denominated
as second-degree murder, but the law expressly provides that a heat-ofpassion murder constitutes a third-degree felony (ordinarily punishable by
from four to twelve years' imprisonment), whereas an unprovoked knowing
murder is a second-degree felony (ordinarily punishable by from eight to
twenty-four years' imprisonment). COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-103(3)(b) (2001);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-105(1)(a)(V)(A) (2001).

The offense of manslaughter is a serious felony that can result in substantial punishment. Punishment for heat-of-passion manslaughter varies by
jurisdiction, and although a judge can sometimes impose a relatively light sentence for the crime, she can choose to impose a very severe one in most states.
To get a sense of the variations, California sets punishment for voluntary
manslaughter at "three, six, or eleven years," CAL. PENAL CODE § 193(a) (West
1999); in the District of Columbia, punishment for heat-of-passion manslaughter may not exceed thirty years' imprisonment, D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-2105
(2001); in Georgia, imprisonment must be not less than one year nor more
than twenty years, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-2(b) (1999); and in Maine the judge
may sentence the provoked killer to a definite period not to exceed forty years'
imprisonment, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1252(2)(A) (West Supp. 2001).
If the defense were abolished, provoked homicides would be treated as
murder, typically second-degree (due to lack of premeditation or deliberation)
murder. Using the state examples above, in the absence of the defense, punishment in California would be fifteen years to life, CAL. PENAL CODE § 190(a)
(West 1999 & Supp. 2002); in the District of Columbia, a sentence not in excess of forty years except in certain aggravating circumstances, D.C. CODE
ANN. §§ 22-2104(c), 24.403.01(b-2) (2001); in Georgia, death or life imprisonment, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-5-1(d) (1999) (no second-degree form of murder); in
Maine, twenty-five years to life imprisonment, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A,
§ 1251 (West 1983 & Supp. 2001) (no second-degree form of murder).
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claim that the "defense" treats provoked homicide as a minor
offense. Modern criticism of provocation law is more interesting than that, however. Heat-of-passion law has been the subject of ethical, and most especially, feminist attack. We are told
that "[violuntary manslaughter [heat-of-passion doctrine] has
never been a female-friendly doctrine" and, indeed, "continues
to perpetuate a violent form of male subordination of women."9
Somewhat similarly, commentator Robert Mison attacked
provocation law on the ground that it devalues gay victims of
violence.' 0 Mison, however, did not call for abolition of the defense. Instead, he argued that because of rampant homophobia
in society, defendants should not be able to assert a claim that
they were provoked to kill as the result of a nonviolent homo12
sexual advance. 1' In 1995, I argued against Mison's position.
In doing so, I suggested that a stronger case could be made for
a wholesale attack on the defense on feminist grounds than by
13
singling out one category of cases for special treatment.
At least one feminist scholar found my 1995 efforts at justifying the provocation defense in homosexual-advance cases
"fascinating" and "bizarre," 14 in light of my feminist concessions. My purpose then, however, was limited to showing that
if one believed in the provocation defense (as seemed to be Mison's position), it was unprincipled, or at least, inconsistent to
categorically exclude nonviolent-homosexual-advance cases
from its ambit. Now I wish to defend the doctrine against more
systematic attacks.
My defense of the provocation doctrine can ultimately be
rejected on various levels. Those who believe a retributive (just
deserts 5 ) philosophy has no relevance in grading criminal of9. Emily L. Miller, Comment, (Wo)manslaughter: Voluntary Manslaughter, Gender, and the Model Penal Code, 50 EMORY L.J. 665, 667-78 (2001).
10. Robert B. Mison, Comment, Homophobia in Manslaughter:The Homosexual Advance as Insufficient Provocation,80 CAL. L. REV. 133 (1992).
11. Id. at 136, 177-78.
12. See Dressier, "Heterosexual"Men, supra note 2, at 728 ("This Article

responds with particularity to Mison's thesis ...
13. Id. at 762-63.
14. "What is fascinating about Dressler's argument in favour of the provocation defence is the bizarre twist in which feminist arguments against the
defence are deployed against Mison, but not against the provocation doctrine."
Adrian Howe, More Folk Provoke Their Own Demise (Homophobic Violence
and Sexed Excuses-Rejoining the Provocation Law Debate, Courtesy of the
Homosexual Advance Defence), 19 SYDNEY L. REv. 336, 359 (1997).

15. Some persons are repelled by retributivism because they equate it
with the proposition that it is morally right to hate (and, therefore, hurt)
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fenses will find my analysis wrong or irrelevant, as may anyone
who persists in viewing the defense as a partial justification,
rather than a partial excuse. Beyond that, it must be acknowledged that recognition of any criminal law defense or mitigating factor inevitably will result in occasional verdicts that will
prove objectionable to fair-minded persons; occasional "bad"
results, however, hardly justify abolition of a defense.
Finally, I must stress that feminist concerns regarding the
defense deeply concern me, and I concede that I was oblivious
to such issues when I began my legal journey into provocation
law two decades ago. Feminist scholarship in this field is important. Ultimately, however, I reject the view that criminal
homicide law would be more just without the heat-of-passion
doctrine.
I develop my arguments for the defense as follows. In Part
I, I consider provocation through a utilitarian lens. I argue
that efforts to defend the partial defense on such grounds are
questionable. If one develops criminal homicide rules on deterrence grounds, a case can be made for abolishing the doctrine
or, ironically, expanding the doctrine to a full defense. I submit, however, that utilitarian arguments about the defense are
largely beside the point. The provocation doctrine is founded
on just deserts grounds; the cases for and against the defense
ought to be fought on that level.
In Part II, I deal with potential claims that the provocation
doctrine should be interpreted as a partial justification defense.
Again, if this were the basis for the defense, the case for its abolition would be compelling. In Part III, however, I show that
the defense should not be understood in justificatory terms. It
is a partial excuse based on the actor's partial loss of selfcontrol, although (and here is where confusion lies) the reason
for the actor's loss of self-control sometimes (but not always)
has a justificatory-type component.
In Part IV, I lay out the feminist argument for abolishing
the defense, and seek to show that the abolitionist claims are
inadequate to the task as long as the defense is understood in
criminals. E.g., 2 JAMES

FiTZJAMEs STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL

LAW OF ENGLAND 80-82 (London, MacMillan 1883). I, too, reject this 'assaultive" version of retributivism, see Joshua Dressier, Hating Criminals: How
Can Something That Feels So Good Be Wrong?, 88 MICH.L. REV. 1448, 145153 (1990) (describing three versions of retribution), but not retribution generally. I will use the terms 'Just deserts" and "retribution" interchangeably to
describe the basic retributive idea that wrongdoers should get what they deserve, i.e., punishment proportional to their moral wrongdoing.
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just-deserts-loss-of-self-control terms. I also consider the alternative position that the defense should be maintained but significantly narrowed in domestic violence cases. Here, in particular, I discuss and ultimately reject Professor Victoria
Nourse's intriguing proposition that the defense should be limited to cases in which the provoking act is itself a wrong that
16
the law would independently punish by incarceration.
In Part V, I consider the proper contours of the provocation
defense. I look first at the influential Model Penal Code "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" version of the defense. 17 I conclude that although it frees the law from some
undesirable common law restrictions, it is a flawed statute. I
offer here my own version of a proper provocation defense. It
contains sensible components of the Model Penal Code, the
English Homicide Act of 1957, and American common law. It is
consistent with the underlying rationale of the defense as a
partial excuse based on partial loss of self-control, but one that
does not undermine the normative anti-violence message of the
criminal law.
A final introductory observation: Readers may ultimately
disagree with my perspective. I hope one concludes from this
Essay, however, that the abolitionist claim is not as obvious as
some critics of the defense might have us believe. My plea is
for readers, at a minimum, to appreciate the difficulties and
complexities of the issue.18 The defense has a long heritage
and, in view of overwhelming modern-day legislative recognition of the defense, 19 we should hesitate long and hard before
abolishing or significantly narrowing the centuries-old doctrine.
I. PROVOCATION AND UTILITARIANISM
I will spend relatively little time on utilitarian arguments,
not because they are less interesting, but because most modern
scholars would agree that the basis for the defense of provocation is found in retributive concepts of desert, i.e., "a concession
16. Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the
ProvocationDefense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1396 & n.381 (1997).
17. See infra note 107.
18. See Martha C. Nussbaum, A Plea for Difficulty, in IS
MULTIcULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? SUSAN MOLLER OKIN WITH
RESPONDENTS 105, 114 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., 1999) (responding to an es-

say by Susan Okin who called for a feminist critical examination of cultural
practices that oppress women).
19. See supra note 8.
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to human weakness."20 Utilitarian concerns are subordinate, if
not makeweight.
The Model Penal Code (MPC) Commentary, seemingly
halfheartedly, suggests a utilitarian justification, supplementing the "human weakness" rationale with the common law
provocation doctrine. It states that "perhaps"21 the nondeterrability of the provoked party justifies mitigation: But,
will this do? If the actor is so out of control that he22 is truly
non-deterrable, and if specific deterrence is the basis for the defense, then a very plausible claim can be made that the defense
should be total, rather than partial.
We can also make an opposite utilitarian argument. The
partial nature of the defense suggests that the provoked party
has not lost full control; he finds it more difficult, but not impossible, to obey the law. If so, this would seem to be a situation in which the law ought to provide less temptation, not
more, to disobey the law, by treating the intentional killing as
murder, rather than manslaughter.2 3 So, if utilitarians seek to
rationalize the provocation doctrine on specific deterrence
grounds, a stronger case can be made, I think, for no defense or
a full one than for the present law.
A more plausible utilitarian claim might be that the defense is "recognition of the fact that one who kills in response to
certain provoking events should be regarded as demonstrating
a significantly different character deficiency than one who kills
in their absence.2 4 Presumably what is meant is that those
who kill under provocation have not only a different, but a less
serious, character deficiency than the ordinary intentional killer. If one is going to travel down this path, however, the im20. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.3, at 55 (1980); see
also Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 219 (1862) (providing the defense "out of
indulgence to the frailty of human nature").
21.

MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.3, at 55.

22. I use the word "he" throughout this Essay to describe provoked parties
because most heat-of-passion defendants (indeed, most persons charged with
any crime of violence) are male. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 1998, at

340 (Kathleen Maguire & Ann L. Pastore eds., 1999) [hereinafter CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS] (reporting that 83.8% of arrestees in 1997 for violent

crime were male).
23. The same argument has been made to abolish the duress defense.
E.g., 2 STEPHEN, supra note 15, at 107 ("Surely it is at the moment when
temptation to [commit] crime is strongest... that the law should speak most
clearly and emphatically to the contrary.").
24.

MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.3, at 55.
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portance of character to a utilitarian, presumably, is in predicting future dangerousness. Such predictions are not highly reliable, 25 but it defies common sense to think that, to take examples of potential provocation claims that might arise today, a
man who kills in rage from observing his wife's adultery 26 or
because a female acquaintance rejected his romantic advances,27 is a priori less dangerous than the "ordinary" killer
(murderer).
Criminal homicides involve a great diversity of cases: from
premeditated contract killings to premeditated euthanasia
homicides to unpremeditated intentional killings to cases involving no intent to kill at all. Surely a rage killer may be more
dangerous-his character flaw is more troubling if there is any
meaningful risk that his anger will rise again-than, for example, a son who kills his dying father to put him out of his misery.2 8 The character flaws of the provoked individual may seem
more benign-more like our own?-than the flaws of an imagined first-degree (or even second-degree) murderer, but there is
no empirical evidence supporting the claim that voluntary
manslaughterers are, as a group, less dangerous than murderers.

29

25. Our capacity to predict future dangerousness may be improving, but
John Monahan recently observed that "the level of predictive validity revealed
in the research has at least in the case of violent crime been rather modest."
John Monahan, Prediction of Crime and Recidivism, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
CRIME & JUSTICE 1125, 1129 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002); see also JOHN
MONAHAN ET AL, RETHINKING RISK ASSESSMENT: THE MACARTHUR STUDY OF
MENTAL DISORDER AND VIOLENCE 13 (2001) (noting that "research continues
to indicate that clinicians' unaided abilities to perform this task [of violence
risk assessment] are modest at best"). For an earlier appraisal, see Charles
Patrick Ewing, Preventive Detention and Execution: The Constitutionality of
PunishingFuture Crimes, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 139, 141-46 (1991). Ewing
observes that "the most optimistic behavioral scientists and legal commentators now seem to believe that the accuracy of predictions of dangerousness ...
is 'probably no better than one valid assessment out of two,'" whereas others
believe that the accuracy rate is only one in three. Id. at 141.
26. See Holmes v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions, 2 All E.R. Ann. 124, 128 (H.L.
1946) (holding that a wife's confession of adultery to her husband without
more is not sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter).
27. People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310, 1312 (N.Y. 1980). The New York
Court of Appeals applied the MPC's defense of "extreme emotional disturbance," from which the state's penal statute was drawn. Id. at 1316.
28. State v. Forrest, 362 S.E.2d 252, 253-54 (N.C. 1987) (affirming a conviction for first-degree murder).
29. Some unpremeditated killings are quite arguably more heinous, and
the killers more dangerous, than premeditated homicides. For example, a person who impulsively throws a child into the street to kill the youth is probably
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One final utilitarian point: Even if the provoked actor is
undeterrable at the moment of killing, this hardly speaks to the
question of whether the law can serve a useful role in advance
of the angry attack. Perhaps the law ought to take the position
that those who kill in rage need to make greater efforts to learn
how to deal more constructively with their anger so that they
don't lash out violently and kill. Abolition of the provocation
defense, therefore, might send a useful general deterrence message that people should manage their anger and stress before
emotions boil over in violence, or they will be treated the same
as those who kill calmly.
The point is that if the provocation doctrine is analyzed
through the utilitarian lens, the case for the centuries-old partial nature of the defense-indeed for excuses generally3 0-is
questionable. None of this, however, suggests to me that the
defense should be abolished. It suggests that the true basis for
the defense will be discovered elsewhere, in retributive concepts of just deserts. As with other excuses, the provocation
doctrine is based on conceptions of justice to the wrongdoer. 31
II. PROVOCATION AS A JUSTIFICATION DEFENSE
Some scholars expressly treat provocation as a partial jusmore dangerous, and such actions more heinous, than a victim's family member who premeditates a euthanasia killing. It should follow, therefore, that
even the suddenness of passion required for common law manslaughter need
not support the claim that manslaughterers are less dangerous than seconddegree murderers.
30. As discussed infra in Part HI, the provocation defense is best understood as an excuse defense. Despite efforts by Bentham and other utilitarians
to defend the existence of criminal law excuses, utilitarian arguments may
support the abolition of all legal excuses, on the ground that
punishing all [wrongdoers], whether or not they happen to be deterrable closes off
any hope a deterrable offender might otherwise harbor that he could convince a jury
that he was among the nondeterrable. Moreover, without excuses, prosecutions
would be faster and cheaper, convictions more reliable, and the deterrent threat
more credible.

Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime, 75 CAL. L. REV. 257, 263 (1987) (footnote
omitted).
31. See id. at 264 ("To blame a person is to express a moral criticism, and
if the person's action does not deserve criticism, blaming him is a kind of
falsehood and is, to the extent the person is injured by being blamed, unjust to
him."); Joshua Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress: Justifying the Excuse
and Searching for Its Proper Limits, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1361 n.175
(1989) [hereinafter Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress] (claiming that "it
is a sense of justice... that causes us to excuse certain wrongdoers"). Of
course, in the case of provocation, which is only a partial excuse, the claim is
that it is unjust to punish a person as severely as one would a murderer.
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tification-as distinguished from an excuse-defense. 32 And
some critiques of the defense are founded at least in part on the
assumption that it is justification-based or are due to the
critic's lack of sensitivity to the justification/excuse distinction.33 Understood in (partial) excuse terms, however, recognition of the provocation doctrine does not imply that victims are
less worthy or that society (partially) condones a killer's actions, any more so than a murder acquittal based on insanity or
mitigation based on diminished capacity. Moreover, it is beyond serious dispute that the line between murder and manslaughter is not drawn as it is because a "manslaughter death"
is more acceptable than a "murder death." The difference between the crimes is that a murderer is more culpable for his
killing than a manslaughterer. As will be seen, 34 there can (but
need not) be a justificatory feature of the doctrine, but it should
be characterized as an (partial) excuse defense.
The argument for treating provocation as a (partial) justification is that "the defence entails a denial that the defendant's
actions were entirely wrongful in the first place." 35 Indeed, as I
have previously demonstrated, 36 some aspects of the common
law doctrine are best (or, perhaps, only) explained on justificatory grounds. For example, an old English rule dictated that a
husband's sight of his wife's adultery constituted adequate
provocation to kill the paramour, which mitigated the homicide
to manslaughter, but a similar sighting of unfaithfulness by a
fianc6 did not result in mitigation. 37 This contradiction is explainable on the antiquated patriarchal ground that, because
32. See, e.g., Finbarr McAuley, Anticipating the Past: The Defence of
Provocationin IrishLaw, 50 MOD. L. REV. 133, 139 (1987).

33. For instance, one commentator criticized the use of the heat-of-passion
defense in homicides provoked by homosexual advances. See Mison, supra
note 10, at 136. While often treating the defense as an excuse, the author's critique sometimes was founded on partial justificatory grounds. For example,
the author suggested that use of the defense implies the lesser worth of gay
victims, see id., and stated that "the difference between murder and manslaughter turns on the distinction between behavior society finds acceptable
and behavior that it does not," id. at 172.
34.

See discussion infraPart

m.

35. McAuley, supra note 32, at 139.
36. Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion,supra note 1, at 439-41.
37. Manning's Case, 83 Eng. Rep. 112, 112 (1793) (finding by jury that
adultery is sufficient provocation to reduce the charge to manslaughter); see
The King v. Greening, 3 KB. 846, 849 (1913) (holding that the law of provocation does not apply to a couple living together); see also The King v. Palmer, 2
KB. 29, 31 (1913) (noting that the confession of adultery by a wife is sufficient
provocation but not a confession by a fianc).
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adultery was considered the "highest invasion of [a husband's]
property,"38 the deceased paramour's actions constituted "a
form of injustice perpetrated upon the killer... whereas 'mere'
sexual unfaithfulness out of wedlock [did] not."39 According to
this approach, the husband was justified in protecting his property, but the excessiveness of his efforts reduced the justification to a partial defense only. When one understands the basis
of this old rule of law, it is easy to consider repealing the provocation defense. Today, however, nobody in the United States
would take seriously the wife/fianc6 property law distinction,
and in any case, if the defense is seen
in excuse terms, as it
40
should be, this distinction evaporates.
Even when one moves away from such antiquated reasoning, there is additional evidence that courts and legislatures
sometimes treat the doctrine as if it were a justification defense. The common law and, often, statutory "misdirected retaliation" rule-namely, that the defense only applies if the
provoked party seeks to kill the provoker and not an innocent
third party-is best explained on justificatory grounds. For
example, in an Australian case, a father observed his son
knocked down and injured by a car driven by Dibbs. 42 The father, enraged by the driver's actions, moved towards Dibbs
with a knife, intending to attack him, but an innocent bystander prevented him from doing so and was thereupon killed
by the father. 43 The trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury on
provocation was approved by the Victoria Supreme Court, even
as it hinted that had the father killed Dibbs, a provocation
claim would lie.4
Applying an excuse theory (at least, the type I advocate),
the court's refusal to allow the jury to consider the provocation
38. Regina v. Mawgridge, [17071 Kel. J. 119, 137, reprinted in 84 Eng.
Rep. 1107, 1115.
39. Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion,supra note 1, at 440.
40. As an excuse claim, a defendant could arguably claim provocation in
both cases. The feminist critique, as we will see, while agreeing that the
wife/fianc6 distinction should be abandoned, would deny the defense in both
cases. See infra text accompanying notes 81-85.
41. E.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2503(a)(1)-(2) (1998) (defining manslaughter in terms of "sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation
by: (1) the individual killed; or (2) another whom the actor endeavors to kill");
Regina v. Duffey, 1 All E.R. 932, 932 (Crim. App. 1949) (defining
"[p]rovocation [a]s some act ... done by the dead man to the accused").
42. Regina v. Scriva (No 2), (1951) V.L.R. 298,299.
43. Id. at 300.
44. Id. at 300-01.
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claim was wrong. It is, however, correct if one views provocation as a justificatory doctrine premised on the ground that the
deceased's wrongful conduct caused the killer's violent outburst 45 and, critically, that the deceased-but not the bystander-therefore, (partially) forfeited his right to life, (partially) deserved to die, 46 or that his death constitutes lesser
social harm than the death of an innocent person.
Although as with all moral arguments one may dispute the
point, I consider such justificatory reasoning-the suggestion
that a person forfeits his right to life (or, incoherently, forfeits
part of his life), or that a private aggrieved individual may unilaterally determine that another human being "sort of' deserves death or that his life does not count as much as another's-morally objectionable.
This is not to suggest that such reasoning cannot be found
elsewhere in the literature in regard to well-recognized justification defenses, because it can be. In those circumstances,
however, in which such reasoning has on occasion justified
homicides, the deceased's conduct involved life-threatening behavior, or at least conduct that would have justified the death
penalty upon arrest and conviction. 47 In provocation cases,
however, the deceased's alleged behavior is apt to involve nothing more than highly insulting or offensive conduct, or immoral
but not physically injurious conduct (e.g., adultery); and, even
in more extreme cases, the provocation typically consists of
non-capital criminal conduct (e.g., rape of a family member 4s)
that may justify severe punishment of the wrongdoer/provoker
45. See McAuley, supra note 32, at 137.
46. Can one partially justify the killing on the ground that "he [the decedent] started it?" It is true that the fact that another person comes to the
event without clean hands and, indeed, "started it" explains the defendant's
anger. This fact begins to explain why we do not blame the defendant for the
homicide as much as we would if he had acted without provocation. In my
view, however, as long as the provocation does not cross over into a justificatory-like claim of self defense or defense of others, the "he started it" refrain
does not justify, even partially, the use of deadly force upon a provoker. The
fact that another person "started it" is justification for some response, usually
a reprimand or some other showing of disapprobation, or even a civil action,
but little else.
47. E.g., Petrie v. Cartwright, 70 S.W. 297, 299 (Ky. 1902) (explaining
that common law felonies were punishable by death, and therefore, by committing a capital crime a felon forfeited his right to life; consequently, use of
deadly force against such a person was justifiable).
48. In contrast to the common law, rape is no longer a capital offense in
the United States, in part because it leads to constitutionally disproportional
punishment for the offense. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977).
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after a fair trial but hardly serves as the basis for privately imposed capital "punishment." So, I am quite willing to agree
that if forfeiture or some lesser social harm justificatory theory
is the true and only basis for the provocation doctrine, the defense should be abandoned.
There is another way one might try to understand provocation in justificatory terms. Professor Jeremy Horder has pro49
vided a fascinating account of English provocation doctrine.
His explanation of early provocation law is based on "Aristotelian notions of just retribution for... unjust losses [of personal
honor] attributable to provocative wrong-doing."50
Horder
writes that in the seventeenth century and earlier in England,
[niatural honour [as distinguished from acquired honor] was the good
opinion of others founded in the assumption that the person honoured
by the good opinion was morally worthy of such esteem and respect.... To treat a man with irreverence, disdain, or contempt, to
poke fun at him or to accuse him (even in jest) of failing in point of
virtue, was, accordingly, to fail to treat him with respect; it was to
undermine or disregard the supposition, at the heart51of natural honour, that he was not deficient in any principal virtue.

The Aristotelian man of honor, Horder has explained, not
only was expected to retaliate against the offender, but was
supposed to do so without reluctance. 2 Indeed, the honorable
man was morally justified in responding to provocation (or, at
least, to those forms of provocation recognized in early common
law) in anger, but with a specific type of anger: "anger as outrage,"53 rather than anger based on loss of self-control. The
hot-blooded response of the man of honor was not an out-ofcontrol response to an affront, but was a morally justified hotblooded and controlled rational retaliation in proportion to the
nature and degree of provocation involved."
What if the man of honor responded disproportionately to
the provocation? Then, the offense was manslaughter if the actor's response was only slightly excessive; it was murder if the
response was grossly excessive, i.e., the taking of life in response to a very trivial provocation. 55
49. JEREMY HORDER, PROVOCATION AND REsPoNSIBILITY (1992).
50. G.R. Sullivan, Anger and Excuse: ReassessingProvocation,13 OXFORD

J. LEGAL STUD. 421, 422 (1993) (explaining Horder's thesis).
51.

HORDER, supra note 49, at 26.

52.
53.
54.
55.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 27.
at 59-71.
at 27.
at 64.
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One could take from Horder's account that provocation
should be treated as a partial justification founded on an actor's
right to respond with moderate violence to an attack on
honor.5 6 Such a conclusion, however, strikes me as conceptually wrong. Either a person has a right to act in a certain
manner or he does not. Even if one has a right to respond to
provocation with non-deadly force (and, thus, be acquitted), a
homicide-doing what one does not have a right to do-should
be explained (if at all) in excusatory terms. In any case, even if
Horder's account explains seventeenth century (and earlier)
English attitudes, it is not proper today in the United States for
a "virtuous person" to respond violently-even to commit a
battery-in mere defense of one's honor.
Therefore, the remainder of this Essay is founded on the
assumption that the provocation doctrine should not be (and,
generally, is not today) understood in justificatory terms. The
defense is excuse-based.
III. PROVOCATION: WHY WE PARTIALLY EXCUSE
HOMICIDE
The provocation defense is an excuse defense, albeit a partial one, but one that may (but need not) have a justificationlike component. My best effort to explain basic provocation
law57 runs as follows: An intentional homicide is not mitigated
to manslaughter unless certain conditions are met. First, there
must be a provocative event that results in the actor feeling
rage or some similar overwrought emotion. 58 It is important
here to understand why the provocation does-and does notresult in anger. It is not that the provocation "touches a nerve"
as, for example, when a person drops a cup when he is stung on
the hand by a wasp.5 9 The act of dropping the cup-the wasp
almost literally hitting a nerve-is a physiological action (in le56. Horder, however, does not make this claim. He couches the defense in
excuse terms, and thereafter, proposes that the provocation doctrine be abandoned. Id. at 186-97.
57. I put aside for now the Model Penal Code's approach to the doctrine,
which contains a diminished capacity component that complicates analysis.
See infra text accompanying notes 120-25. All I seek to do here is provide an
explanation for a relatively traditional provocation doctrine.
58. See People v. Borchers, 325 P.2d 97, 102 (Cal. 1958) (defining "passion" in the heat-of-passion doctrine as including any "[vliolent, intense, highwrought or enthusiastic emotion" (quoting Webster's New International Dictionary (2d ed.)).
59.

HORDER, supra note 49, at 119.
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gal terms, an involuntary act) and not one "mediated by judgment and reason."60 In the provocation context, however, anger
is preceded by some judgment by the provoked party, even if it
occurs instantly, that he or another to whom he feels an emotional attachment has been wronged in some manner by the
provoker. 61 In the ordinary provocation case, for example,
when the provoker spits in another's face, uses insulting racial
epithets, wrongs the individual by assaulting him, or commits
some harm to a loved one, the provoker sends a disparaging
message (or, at least, the provoked party reasonably interprets
it this way) or commits a seeming injustice, which incites the
victim of the provocation to fury.
Fury, however, is not enough to activate the defense. The
law considers only some provocations "adequate" to reduce a
homicide to manslaughter. If we believe that the provocation is
the type that entitles a person to feel anger, or even more
strongly, if we feel that the provocation should make a person
feel anger or outrage, e.g., when a person is verbally insulted or
spat upon, then we may characterize the emotion as, in some
sense, "justifiable"62 or, if you will, appropriate. 63 In this very
limited way the heat-of-passion doctrine potentially contains a
"justificatory" feature.
The basis for mitigation, however, does not require a finding that the provoked party's anger or outrage is one we find
appropriate or of which we approve ("justifiable"). It is enough
that we are prepared to "excuse" 64 the actor for feeling as he
60. Id. at 117.
61. I use the term "another" broadly enough to include an actor's attachment not only to another person, but to another living thing (e.g., the actor's
pet dog is thrown by the decedent into the road, where it is killed; Maria L. La
Ganga, Jury Convicts Man Who HurledDog Into Traffic, LA. TIMES, June 20,
2001, at Al).
62. I am using the term 'Justification" here loosely because these terms
are ordinarily reserved to characterize conduct rather than emotions. (Thus
the quotations marks around the words in the text.)
63. Dan M. Kahan & Martha C.Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion
in CriminalLaw, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 320 (1996).

64. Again, see supra note 46, I use the word "excuse" loosely, since the
term ordinarily applies to blameless people and not to blameless emotions.
Indeed, to "excuse" a person's feelings may suggest that a person can be morally to blame for having certain feelings or emotions. It is far from obvious,
however, that people have meaningful control over their feelings or emotions,
as distinguished from their conduct, so this terminology is imprecise.
This topic deserves far more attention than a footnote. It is enough for me
to say here that people do commonly consider certain feelings and emotions,
separate from conduct, as "good" or "virtuous" (e.g., feelings of compassion) or
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does, or perhaps more precisely, we empathize with the actor's
feelings. We must remember that the provocation defense is
based to a considerable extent on the law's concession to ordinary human frailty; the ultimate question, therefore, is
whether we (or the jury) consider the provoked party's anger
within the range of expected human responses to the provocative situation. Put somewhat differently, we must decide if the
provocative event might cause an ordinary person 65-one

of or-

dinary and neither short nor saintly temperament-to become
enraged or otherwise emotionally overcome.
For example, consider a person's emotional upheaval in being informed by his long-time married paramour that she intends to end the relationship and return to her husband. A
jury may be unwilling to think of the man's anger or other passionate emotions as justifiable. After all, the woman had every
right-indeed, perhaps a moral duty-to call off the relationship, and thus the man had no right to expect the woman to
continue the relationship. A jury, however, could (not necessarily would) consider the man's emotional outburst "excusable"
("empathizable?"), 66 even if it were not prepared to characterize
it as appropriate. That is enough to meet the first ingredient of
the provocation defense.
One must keep in mind-although critics of the provocation doctrine often do not-that "justifying" or "excusing" the
"bad" or "unvirtuous" (e.g., feelings of pleasure in observing another's tragedy).
When a person has "bad" (wrongful) emotions, we criticize that person. Absent evidence of mental illness or the like, we do not "excuse" him for feeling
as he does.
65. Most courts in provocation cases use the term "reasonableman" or
"reasonable person" when instructing the jury on the concept of "adequate
provocation" and on the "cooling off' requirement, i.e., that the killing occur
before a "reasonable person" would have cooled off. Some courts, however, use
the term "ordinary" person. E.g., Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 220 (1862).
The latter term avoids the oddity of describing a "reasonable person" as one
who acts on occasion in a rage, rather than with due deliberation. On the
other hand, use of the word "reasonable" reinforces the important point that
the objective standard contains a normative component and is not merely descriptive. I will use the term "reasonable person" and "ordinary person" interchangeably in this Essay.
66. I (and I suspect most readers) would feel this way, but one can always
add to the facts to strengthen the argument that a jury might excuse the rejected man for his emotional state. Perhaps the paramour promised to leave
her husband and marry him, and in reliance on these assurances he made significant changes in his life (changed jobs), only to have her decide not to marry
him. Now, a jury might even consider his anger appropriate ("justifiable").
Either way-2justifiable" or "excusable"-this aspect of the provocation doctrine is satisfied.
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provoked party for his emotional upset does not in itself entitle
the defendant to mitigation for a killing. My use of the term
"emotional outburst" in the last paragraph was purposeful: It
points us in the direction of why provocation is an excuse defense, and not a justification. The modern defense is not about
justifiable and controlled anger as outrage to honor; it is about
excusable loss of self-control. It is not enough simply to say
that a defendant's anger, which was mediated by judgment and
reason, was, in the sense I have explained, justifiable or excusable: The provocation must be so serious that we are prepared
to say that an ordinary person in the actor's circumstances,
even an ordinarily law-abiding person of reasonable temperament, might become sufficiently upset by the provocation to experience substantial impairment of his capacity for self-control
and, as a consequence, to act violently.
Under no circumstances is the provoked killing justifiable
in the slightest; indeed, the actor's violent loss of self-control is
unjustifiable. Moreover, the loss of self-control is not totally
excusable, because the law's assumption is that the provoked
party was not wholly incapable of controlling or channeling his
anger. If he were totally incapable, a full excuse would be defensible. 67 Instead the defense is based on our common experience that when we become exceptionally angry-remembering
that we are not blaming the person for his anger-our ability to
conform our conduct to the dictates of the law is seriously undermined, hence making law-abiding behavior far more difficult than in nonprovocative circumstances. 68 It is this under67. Dressier, Rethinking Heat of Passion,supra note 1, at 465-66, 468.
68. A person is properly excused for his conduct if he lacked the capacity
or fairopportunity to freely choose whether to violate the moral or legal norms
of the community. More specifically, -[flree choice' exists if the actor has the
substantial capacity and fair opportunity to: (1) understand the pertinent facts
relating to his conduct; (2) appreciate that his conduct violates society's moral
or legal norms; and (3) conform his conduct to the law." Joshua Dressier, Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and the Model

Penal Code, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671, 701 (1988) [hereinafter Dressler, Reflections]. In the case of provocation, we say that the defendant experienced a
partial, temporary, and substantial lack of capacity (rather than fair opportunity) to conform his conduct to the law (the third element of the 'free choice"
standard). The provocation defense, therefore, focuses on the internal mechanisms of the provoked party and focuses on his (partially) excusable (significant) loss of capacity for self-control.
Arguably, the provocation defense may be defended, like the duress defense, on the ground that the provoked party lacked a fair opportunity to conform his conduct to the law. In cases of coercion-when a gun is literally or
figuratively put to the head of the coerced party-we excuse the latter's crimi-
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standably greater difficulty to control conduct that appropriately mitigates a provoked actor's blameworthiness, and therefore, his responsibility for a homicide.
IV. FEMINIST CHALLENGES TO THE DEFENSE
A. THE ABOLITIONIST ARGUMENT

Most provocation abolitionists come to their view from a
feminist perspective. One critic has written that "provocation
operates as a deeply sexed excuse for murder and should be
abolished." 69 Further, "nowhere except perhaps in rape cases0
is the gendered-or, more accurately 'sexed'-nature of law
more apparent than in so-called domestic homicide cases in
which men kill women and then claim provocation." 70 The
feminist claim for abolition of the defense basically runs as follows.
Provocation is a male-centered and male-dominated defense. 7 1 Although the defense is supposedly founded on compassion for ordinary human infirmity, it is really a legal disguise to partially excuse male aggression by treating men "as
natural aggressors, and in particular women's natural aggressors."72 Men who are provoked desire to inflict retaliatory suffering on those who have attacked their self-worth. More often
nal conduct on the ground that she did not have a fair opportunity to obey the
law. Dressier, Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 31, at 1365. In essence, an external event, for which the actor is not morally responsible, acts
upon her to make the choice to obey the law too difficult to fairly attach blame
to her for not selecting the right option. One might plausibly say that provocation similarly functions to reduce choice-making opportunities, rather than
undermining the actor's capacity to choose the correct (nonviolent) path.
There are similarities between provocation and duress. Indeed, since
provocation is a valid partial excuse to murder, gun-to-the-head duress should
at least partially excuse a homicide, although the common law rejects any defense in this regard. Id. at 1370-74 (arguing for a potential full excuse in such
circumstances). Nonetheless, I believe that provocation is better understood
in loss-of-self-control (more accurately, partial-loss-of-capacity-for-self-control)
terms than in lack-of-fair-opportunity terms. In duress cases, we sense that
the coerced party chooses to accede to the coercer's threat; it is in a real sense
a rational, albeit perhaps socially unjustifiable, choice. We excuse the actor
because her choices were unfairly hard. In contrast, with provocation, the killing is the result of an emotional explosion almost immediately following the
provocation. The homicidal act here is the antithesis of rationality.
69. Howe, supra note 14, at 337.
70. Id. at 356.
71. See HORDER, supra note 49, at 193-94.
72. Id. at 192.
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than not, the self-worth "attackers" are women. In studies of
battered women, for example, violence is prompted by male
possessiveness and sexual jealousy; 73 a male's feelings of selfworth require "absolute possession of a woman's sexual fidelity,
of her labour, and of (on demand) her presence, love, and attention in general.'7 4 In reality, therefore, the defense simply reinforces precisely what the law should seek to eradicate, namely,
75
"men's violence against women, and their violence in general."
These observations are accurate in many respects, but I
submit that they do not justify abolition of the defense. Feminists are correct, of course, that the defense largely benefits
men-but let's put this in perspective. First, the victims of
male violence are more often than not other men, rather than
women.7 6 Second, it is true that the provocation defense benefits men, 77 but so do all other excuse and justification defenses,
most of which are not considered controversial, because men,
far more often than women, kill people for all reasons. 78 Finally, in relation to the specific issue at hand, it should be remembered that the provocation defense is raised in many cases
that do not involve male-on-female (or same-sex) intimate violence.
73. Id. at 193 (citing a 1984 study by Dobash and Dobash).
74. Id.; see also Nourse, supra note 16, at 1343-51 (summarizing studies,
including her own, of intimate homicides, in which a high number, often a majority, of intimate homicides involve some element of separation by a wife, exwife, or unmarried lover from the homicidal male, and a somewhat lesser, but
significant, number of cases involve claims of infidelity).
75. HORDER, supra note 49, at 194.
76. In 1998, 75.3% of all homicide victims were male. FED. BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES:
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1998, at 14 (1999).

77. The critical empirical questions here are: How often is the provocation
defense raised by men in intimate violence cases; and, far more critically, how
often is it successful? There are no reliable data on this. The most we have is
one Justice Department study of "spousal murder" prosecutions in large urban
counties, which suggests that among homicides that resulted in a jury verdict
rather than a pre-trial guilty plea disposition, 29% of the verdicts were for
voluntary manslaughter and 9% for negligent manslaughter. Nourse, supra
note 16, at 1348 n.101 (citing PATRICK A. LANGAN & JOHN M. DAWSON,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPOUSE MURDER
DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, at iv (Sept. 1995)). The voluntary

manslaughter figure includes not only provocation cases but also verdicts
based on reckless manslaughter and imperfect self-defense claims in states
that recognize this defense.
78. In 1997, 89.7% of all persons arrested in the United States for murder
or non-negligent manslaughter were male. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 22, at 340.
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That the provocation defense is primarily invoked by males
is an insufficient reason to repeal it unless we are prepared as
well to call into question all the other defenses, including selfdefense, that are more often claimed by men than by women. If
there are legitimate grounds for the defense, as I have sought
to show-reasons, it ought to be pointed out, that apparently
strike a responsive chord with female jurors, too, since manslaughter verdicts require juror unanimity-we ought to retain
the defense.
Furthermore, lest we forget, women sometimes claim the
provocation defense. Indeed, provocation represents the only
(or, at least, best) partial defense to murder available to battered women who kill their abusers in many (perhaps most) jurisdictions. 79 To abolish the defense is to deny some women
(battered or otherwise) the ability to claim a provocation defense on the Holmesian utilitarian ground that "justice to the

79. A battered woman may claim self-defense, and if valid, be acquitted.
If she kills in non-confrontational circumstances, that is, at a time when the
abuser is asleep or in some other passive condition, or if she kills during a significant lull in the violence, the absence of an imminent threat will usually
leave the battered woman without a valid self-defense claim, although an increasing number ofjurisdictions now recognize a partial defense based on "imperfect self-defense" (unreasonable use of self-defense). See generally JOSHUA
DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 18.03 (3d ed. 2001) (discussing
imperfect self-defense).
A battered woman may claim diminished capacity to reduce the offense to
manslaughter in jurisdictions that retain this partial excuse, but it is a defense based on a potentially demeaning assertion of mental dysfunction by the
woman, a claim that can be avoided by pleading provocation, which asserts
that her emotional response is one that a reasonable or ordinary person might
experience.
Elsewhere I have suggested that battered women who kill in nonconfrontational circumstances should be permitted to plead a full excuse,
based on principles similar to duress. Joshua Dressler, Battered Women Who
Kill Their Sleeping Tormenters:Reflections on MaintainingRespect for Human
Life While Killing Moral Monsters, in CRIMINAL LAW: DOCTRINES OF THE

GENERAL PART 259 (2002).
Some commentators claim that the provocation defense is unavailable to
battered women, on the ground that only rage-not fear or terror-is a recognized emotion in heat-of-passion cases. Christina Pei-Lin Chen, Provocation's
Privileged Desire: The Provocation Doctrine, "Homosexual Panic," and the
Non-Violent Unwanted Sexual Advance Defense, 10 CORNELL J.L. & PUB.
POLY 195, 221 (2000). This is false. See supra text accompanying note 58. In
any case, there is no theoretical reason for such a limitation, and even more to
the point, there is no practical way to enforce such a distinction. A battered
woman who kills her abuser doubtlessly experiences many emotions, one of
which is likely to be (justifiable) anger or outrage at the batterer's treatment
of her.
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individual is rightly outweighed by the larger interests on the
other side of the scales."80 For those who advocate retributive
just deserts, however, that is not a satisfactory reason for denying women the opportunity to assert their excuse claim, even
assuming the accuracy of the premise that abolition of the defense will have a positive general or specific deterrent effect on
81
male domestic violence.
In any case, utilitarian critics of the provocation doctrine
miss the real point of the defense: The provocation defense is
about human imperfection and, more specifically, impaired capacity for self-control. The defense recognizes the fact that anger (and other emotions) can affect self-control. The defense
does not exist to justify or condone male violence or female victimization, nor even to justify or condone any particular emotion. Instead, the defense recognizes a rather ordinary fact: In
provocative circumstances, ordinary people become angry, selfcontrol in such circumstances is more difficult, and in some
cases twelve jurors, probably both men and women, will deter80. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 48 (1943).
81. I have already considered utilitarian issues relating to the provocation
defense, see supra Part I, but two other points might be made here. First, although I have no empirical evidence to support my utilitarian intuitions, I seriously doubt that abolition of the provocation defense would result in a meaningful reduction in male violence toward women. Male violence generally, and
intimate violence in particular, are the result of various interrelated biological,
cultural, even arguably evolutionary, factors. On the latter point, see generally Martin Daly & Margo Wilson, Family Violence: An Evolutionary Psychological Perspective, 8 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 77 (2000). While humans have
the capacity for free choice (at least in the compatibilist or soft determinist
sense) despite these factors, I seriously doubt that repeal of a partial excuse
will cause many violent men to choose nonviolence in provocative circumstances. With or without the defense, a provoked killer will (or, certainly can)
receive a substantial prison sentence, and the difference in penalties between
a manslaughter and murder conviction, see supra note 8, is not likely to be
great enough to do the feminists' work and, therefore, justify sacrificing the
individual (including female defendants) for the greater social cause.
Second, criminological research consistently confirms that on an agecrime curve, the crime rate in the United States generally peaks in adolescence and early adulthood. Most (although not all) crime today in the United
States is committed by persons under the age of thirty. See Darrell
Steffensmeier & Jeffery Ulmer, Age and Crime, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME
& JUSTICE 31 (Joshua Dressler ed., 2d ed. 2002). Thereafter the crime rate
declines, albeit at different rates depending on the criminal offense. There are
various explanations for this, some of which are crime-specific, but reduced
levels of testosterone and somewhat reduced use of intoxicants are of some
significance with violent crimes. See id. at 31-36. Thus, in many cases, a
manslaughterer will leave prison at an age during which recidivism is a much
less significant risk.
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mine that the provoked person who kills is less culpable than
one who kills while in control.
B. NARROWING THE DEFENSE: PROFESSOR NOURSE'S PROPOSAL

If I am right in my defense of the doctrine (that it should
not be abolished), we are still left with the question of what
form the defense should take. Professor Victoria Nourse has
provided a thoughtful reform proposal that deals with feminist
concerns by significantly narrowing the defense in domestic
violence cases. She says,
When a defendant asks for our compassion,82 he asks us to allow him
to legislate vis--vis his victim, to claim that we should share his emotional assessment of wrongdoing and blame.... [But, t]o merit the
reduction of verdict typically associated with manslaughter, the defendant's claim to our compassion must put him in a position of normative equality vis-1-vis his victim. A strong measure of that equality
can be found by asking whether the emotion reflects a wrong that the
law would independently punish. This is not because the law makes
his emotion "right," or "proportional," but because the "law" reflects
an ex ante, disinterested determination of the83normative equities implicit in the defendant's claim for compassion.

In Nourse's scheme, the law would "bar many, if not most,
provocation claims in intimate homicide cases."84 To be entitled
to mitigation, the provoked party would have to point to a
85
criminal law, and not simply a "widely shared social norm[],"
that would justify punishing the decedent for the provocative
action. Thus, for example, the provocation doctrine would not
apply to a husband who observes his spouse in an act of adultery because "[s]ociety is no longer willing to punish adultery.... This does not mean infidelity is not emotionally pain-

ful. It does mean that those who urge compassion based on
infidelity can point to nothing in the law itself that would de82. By this sentence, Nourse seemingly equates compassion with excusing. Although there is often a connection between feelings of compassion and
recognition of legal excuses, the law may properly excuse a person even if we
lack compassion for the offender (for example, we excuse insane people even
though our fear of them may sometimes prevent us from feeling compassion
toward them), and there are many cases in which we feel compassion for an
individual whom we properly refuse to excuse (for example, persons from awful social environments who commit crimes). See Dressler, Reflections, supra
note 68, at 682-89; Dressler, Exegesis of the Law of Duress, supra note 31, at
1360-61. Justice, not compassion, is the true basis for recognizing legal excuses.
83. Nourse, supra note 16, at 1396 (initial italics added).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 1396 n.383.
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mand that we have compassion for their violent outrage."86 It
does not matter to Nourse that, as she concedes, most persons
consider marital infidelity "a grave wrong."87 According to her,
the key is that the same people who consider adultery a grave
wrong "would not support a referendum to put adulterers in
jail."88
What should we make of this proposal? There is an initial
point we should consider: By limiting the defense to criminal
wrongs, we might reach the "right" result-more accurately,
the result most readers of Nourse's and this Essay might
reach-more often than we do now. Yet, even if I (or you, the
reader) would more often prefer the outcomes in Nourse's world
to those rendered in the current legal system, 89 this is insufficient reason to accept her proposal.
Our preference for
Nourse's "verdicts" over ordinary juries may simply be the result of the fact that we are trained in the law, and thus we represent a non-random sampling of the community in which we
live. Indeed, there is occasional anecdotal evidence that jurors
see the world, and especially issues of moral blameworthiness,
differently than law-trained persons.9 0 That, however, is the
point of the jury system: The reason why the constitutional
framers favored trial by jury, and therefore, incorporated the
right in the Sixth Amendment, is that an accused person who
prefers "the common-sense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of a single
judge... [is] to have it." 9 1
Admittedly, one person's common sense may be another
person's prejudice. What makes the jury system so important,
however, is the power of the idea of twelve persons-today, inevitably, both men and women, often of different racial and cul86. Id. at 1396.
87. Id. at 1396 n.383.
88. Id.
89. We lack reliable data on how successful provocation domestic violence
claims are with juries, see supra note 77, so we can only assume that Nourse's
changes would have a significant outcome impact.
90. See, e.g., Court Says Woman Deserved Beating, PALM BEACH POST,

March 4, 1995, at 12A (reporting that in Norway a male defendant was acquitted for beating his girlfriend because she frequently berated him; the two lay
jurors on the three-person panel voted to acquit; the judicial member dissented); see also Joshua Dressler, Peter N. Thompson & Stanley Wasserman,
Effect of Legal Education Upon Perceptionsof Crime Seriousness:A Response
to Rummel v. Estelle, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1247 (1982) (reporting that a law
school course in criminal law affects perceptions of crime seriousness).
91. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
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tural backgrounds-unanimously blaming (or excusing) a
criminal defendant for his actions. The criminal law is all
92
about community condemnation of wrongdoers, so it follows
that a fairly selected jury is institutionally better qualified than
a judge (or legal scholar) to determine whether the defendant's
conduct justifies the community's approbation. 93 We should seriously question, therefore, reform measures that significantly
limit the jury's role in criminal cases, as Nourse's proposal
would do.
Nourse would presumably respond to my pro-jury position
by saying that it
simply evades ...the lurking normative questions. Arguing that juries 'should decide' tells us nothing about which cases 'should' go to
juries. The very act of sending a case to a jury requires some kind of
normative judgment, some choice about those cases in which a ra94
tional jury could find a 'reasonable' explanation for rage.

95
Fair enough. I will have more to say on this subject later,
but it is fair to ask whether Nourse herself has provided an appropriate line. Her test is "whether the emotion reflects a
wrong that the law would independently punish." Is that line
as bright or coherent as we might think? First, even accepting
her distinction, is Nourse willing to stick by her standard?
Some states still prohibit adultery, 96 so would she permit
provocation claims to be brought in those states while denying
it in others, or would she delve more deeply into the matter to
determine how often prosecutions are actually brought in such
jurisdictions?
Notice that even if one agrees with Nourse's thesis-which
I do not-that the provocation doctrine should be limited to illegal acts and not encompass non-criminal violations of widely
shared social norms, she distorts the issue with her "only if we
jail 'em" referendum comment. 97 As Professor Henry Hart has
written, "[wihat distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction

92. See infra text accompanying notes 98-100.
93. Joshua Dressier, Where We Have Been, and Where We Might Be Going:
Some CautionaryReflections on Rape Law Reform, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 409,
414 n.27 (1998) (stating that because criminal convictions are the expression
of the community's condemnation of the actor, a jury is in the better position
to determine the defendant's condemnation).
94. Nourse, supra note 16, at 1372.
95. See infra Part V.C.
96. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. 13-1408 (2001) (criminalizing adultery as a
Class 3 misdemeanor).
97. See supra text accompanying note 88.
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and all that distinguishes it, it is ventured, is the judgment of
community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its
imposition."98 "The essence of punishment for moral delinquency lies in the criminal conviction itself,"99 and not in the
incarceration of the offender. Hart explains that a crime "is
conduct which, if duly shown to have taken place, will incur a
formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation
of the community."1° Thus, the issue for Nourse should not be
whether the public would jail the ordinary adulterer-perhaps
a majority of the public would not jail the ordinary first-time
thief either, and yet theft is a moral wrong and crime-but
whether a majority believe that sexual infidelity deserves the
"formal and solemn pronouncement of the moral condemnation
of the community." 10 1 It seems, however, that she might deny
the provocation defense, even in states that criminalize sexual
infidelity, in the absence of proof of adultery prosecutions resulting in imprisonment (which is an odd requirement).
Second, why does she draw a criminal/non-criminal line?
Why should the provocation defense be denied to a person who
observes his spouse's sexual infidelity in a jurisdiction that
does not criminalize adultery, while potentially permitting a
provocation claim if someone spits in the person's face (a criminal battery)? Why should the defense be disallowed if someone
uses a horrible racial epithet to insult me, but be allowed the
defense if it turns out that this insult violated a criminal
law? 10 2 Is it simply that Nourse has developed a rule that conveniently bars most domestic violence provocation cases while
permitting the defense to do its ordinary work in other areas?
Nourse's explanation is that
[t]he law only suffers contradiction when it refuses to embrace a sense
of outrage which is necessary to the law's rationalization of its own
use of violence. When the law refuses to jail adulterers, the contradiction operates the other way: We are compelled to ask why it is that
private parties may enforce a sense of outrage that society has re-

98.

Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW &

CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404 (1958).
99. George K. Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the
United States, 33 B.U. L. REV. 176, 193 (1953).
100. Hart, supra note 98, at 405.

101. Id.
102. And, what if the criminal law prohibiting the use of racial epithets is
unconstitutional for violation of the First Amendment? Does that affect the
analysis-society wants to punish the provoker but cannot?
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fused itself.

As before, one might start by questioning why the only
form of societal "outrage" that matters is the type that results
in incarceration of the wrongdoer, as distinguished from other
forms of societal condemnation of the actor short of incarceration. Beyond this, however, Nourse's statement demonstrates
the crux of my disagreement with her reasoning. The basis of
the provocation defense, as she sees it, is that a defendant is
partially excused for acting violently toward a person against
whom society would also use violence (albeit in the less excessive form of incarceration). So understood, as Nourse rightly
observes, "[tlo adopt [her] theory... requires us to reject the
idea upon which almost all contemporary theories of the dethe defense are predicated: that we partially excuse because
1°4
self-control."
for
capacity
fair
or
full
a
lacks
fendant
Why does Nourse reject this understanding of the rationale
of the doctrine? Here is her reasoning:
Our belief that persons who lack self-control deserve less punishment
purports to depend upon an analogy with physical coercion: The emotion is seen as the "gun to the head" of the defendant. The problem
with this analogy is there is no intellectually defensible stopping
point: If true, we should be excusing almost all defendants (because
almost all defendants kill in a state of high emotion), and the provocation defense should not be a mitigating factor but a full defense.
When we mitigate rather than acquit, we acknowledge that this
metaphor cannot be quite true.... [W~e mitigate rather than acquit
because we do not believe emotions are like guns. We believe that we
105
can reason ourselves out of emotion ....

Her reasoning is flawed in a number of ways. First, provocation law should not be analogized to gun-to-the-head duress
cases. In duress prosecutions, we do not acquit because the actor lacked the capacity to conform his conduct to the law, but
10 6
rather because the actor lacked a fair opportunity to do so.
Second, as for Nourse's full-excuse point, we do not fully excuse
the provoked party because we do not ordinarily believe that
the defendant's loss of self-control is complete. As Nourse puts
it, we do believe that "we can reason ourselves out of emotion."
It is precisely because we believe that the provoked party's capacity for self-control is not completely undermined that the defense is partial.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Nourse, supra note 16, at 1396-97.
Id. at 1398.
Id. at 1398 n.390.
See supra note 68 (explaining and comparing duress and provocation).
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Third, it is not true that the self-control rationale of the defense requires us to provide a similar defense to all defendants
who kill in a state of high emotion. As I have shown, it is perfectly appropriate to limit the partial defense to one whose lack
of self-control is the result of adequate provocation and not just
any provocation. The law expresses the normative judgment
that the actor "should" have exercised self-control in provocation cases, but we recognize that sometimes a person's capacity
to do so is sufficiently undermined by justifiable or excusable
factors that it is unfair to hold the person fully accountable.
In short, I submit that Professor Nourse has not devised a
suitable alternative to current law.
V. WHERE DO WE GO NOW?
A. MODEL PENAL CODE

One of my failings is that I find it easier to criticize other
people's suggestions than to provide cogent solutions. In my
own defense, as I stated at the outset, provocation law raises
far more difficult issues than some critics of the doctrine seem
willing to face. It is a defense not easily conceptualized, but
neither is it without intuitive power.
In looking at what form the defense should take, the Model
Penal Code (MPC) deserves considerable attention. Professor
Nourse's critique of provocation law focused, in particular, on
the Code's "extreme mental or emotional disturbance" (EMED)
version of the doctrine,10 7 which greatly expands on the common law defense and which also incorporates a version of diminished capacity, sometimes called "partial responsibility,"
within the EMED concept l0 8 Much of the criticism of the
107. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(1)(b) (1962) provides that a criminal
homicide constitutes manslaughter if
a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or
excuse. The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shal [sic] be determined
from the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he
believes them to be.

108. There are two versions of diminished capacity. Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity,75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1, 1 (1984). The first is the mens rea model: Evidence of mental abnormality is
offered by the defense to negate an element (typically, the mens rea element)
of the crime. Id. at 6. This aspect of diminished capacity is covered by MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.02 (permitting evidence "that the defendant suffered from a
mental disease or defect... whenever it is relevant to prove that the defen-
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provocation doctrine in this country is the result of expansions
of the defense inspired by the MPC.
I previously criticized the drafters of the Code for coupling
diminished capacity with provocation doctrine. 109 My claim
was that it is unwise to bring both defenses under one umbrella. Provocation deals with the emotions and actions of ordinary persons, whereas diminished capacity relates to the
thinking processes and actions of unordinary persons. Provocation deals with ordinary human weaknesses, while diminished
capacity focuses on special weaknesses, on illnesses and pathologies.110
This observation regarding the Code's approach is relevant
if we want to retain an independent provocation defense, but it
loses its force if the drafters-or current lawmakers-wish to
move toward a generic mitigation defense. Indeed, Professor
Stephen Morse has proposed just that: a generic mitigation defense (he calls it "guilty but partially responsible"11 ) that
would apply to all crimes, and not simply to criminal homicide.1 12 After all, if a person is entitled to have his offense reduced if he kills because of some mitigating factor (such as adequate provocation), why shouldn't the same arguments apply if
the actor commits an arson or robs a bank or batters another,
rather than killing, as the result of the same condition?
Morse makes a strong conceptual case for a generic partial
excuse. Although he believes that "[amny formula that expressed the central excusing notion would work," 13 he finds the

dant did or did not have a state of mind that is an element of the offense").
The second version of diminished capacity, the "partial responsibility"
version, only applies in criminal homicide cases. Here, the defendant possesses the state of mind necessary to commit the offense of murder, but is entitled to a reduction in offense because he is less morally culpable as the result
of a mental condition affecting his rationality or behavior controls. Morse, supra,at 20-21. It is this latter version of diminished capacity that is implicated
in the manslaughter cases.
109. Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion,supra note 1, at 459.
110. See also Timothy Macklem & John Gardner, Provocationand Pluralism, 64 MOD. L. REV. 815, 815 (2001) (describing the view of Luc Thiet Thuan
v. Regina [1997] AC 131, that provocation "is a defense available only in respect of reasonable losses of temper," whereas diminished capacity "make[s]
allowances for conditions of pathological unreasonableness").
111. Stephen J. Morse, Excusing and the New Excuse Defenses: A Legal
and Conceptual Review, in 23 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH
329, 397 (Michael Tonry ed., 1998).
112. Id. at 397-402.
113. Id. at 400.
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Code's EMED language attractive.
I have concerns with
EMED as a generic partial excuse, 114 but my purpose here is to
consider the EMED defense based on the assumption that a
legislature is not interested in adopting a generic partial excuse.
Starting from this premise, there are two possibilities.
First, some jurisdictions may want to mitigate in both provocation and partial-responsibility circumstances. Second, although
I believe a morally sensitive penal code should recognize a partial responsibility defense to murder, 15 many states may be interested only in retaining a provocation defense. Since this Essay is meant to defend the provocation defense, and not concern
itself with diminished capacity, my attention here centers on
whether the EMED formula treats provocation doctrine appropriately.
The MPC approach has both strengths and weaknesses.
There are various features of the EMED doctrine that belong, I
believe, in any modern provocation defense. First, the Code
wisely eliminates the old, narrow common law pigeonhole categories of "adequate provocation," which included the rigid rule
116
that words alone can never constitute a basis for mitigation.
The Code recognizes what common experience teaches us:
Words can be as explosive as, for example, a physical assault or
act of sexual infidelity. Second, as will be seen,1 1 7 the Code
properly rejects the justificatory-based "misdirected retaliation"
rule of the common law to which some modern statutes, unfortunately, cling. 118
Third and perhaps most significantly, the MPC heroically
struggles-and for this struggle alone, it deserves credit-with
an exceptionally troubling issue largely ignored by courts prior
to its time. The issue is this: To what extent are a defendant's
114. In my view, any generic partial excuse ought to be more explicit than
the EMED language regarding the "central excusing notion." I have set out
my version of that central excusing notion in note 68. Presumably, a partial
excuse would apply when the actor's capacity or opportunity for "free choice"
(as I defined it there) has been somewhat less curtailed than in the case of a
full excuse.
115. See, e.g., Joshua Dressler, Reaffirming the Moral Legitimacy of the
Doctrine of Diminished Capacity:A BriefReply to ProfessorMorse, 75 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 953 (1984).
116.
117.

DRESSLER, supra note 79, § 31.07[B][2][a], at 528-29.
See infra text accompanying note 131.

118. The "misdirected retaliation" rule is explained supra in the text accompanying notes 41-44.
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subjective characteristics relevant in applying the objective
"reasonable person" standard that inheres in the "reasonable
explanation or excuse" concept of MPC manslaughter and, for
that matter, inheres in the common law "adequate provocation"
and "reasonable cooling off time" elements? As developed below, 119 the Code permits more subjectivism than traditional
law. It is this aspect of the Code that is simultaneously its
strength and its potential downfall.
Before turning to the subjectivist aspects of the Code, let
me return to the American Law Institute drafters' decision to
couple provocation with diminished capacity. For those who
want to defend provocation doctrine against attack, this feature
of the Code is unfortunate, because it can confuse lawyers and
jurors, as well as critics of the principle of heat-of-passion.
Consider, for example, People v. Casassa,120 a New York "provocation" case. The male defendant and the female victim dated
casually, after which she told him that she was not "falling in
love" with him and sought to end the relationship. 2 1 This devastated Casassa and resulted in a number of events the Court
of Appeals characterized as "bizarre": He broke into her apartment and eavesdropped on conversations she was having with
others; and he broke into her home when she was away, arrived
armed with a knife, disrobed, and lay on her bed. 22 On the
night of the homicide, Casassa came to her residence, offered
the victim several gifts, and when she rejected them, he
23
stabbed her to death with a steak knife.
These facts have the seeming markings of a provocation
case, but one that would never qualify as manslaughter according to traditional provocation law. The triggering event here is
nothing more than the decedent's rejection of his gifts, which
surely is not "adequate provocation"--provocation liable to
cause a reasonable person to become sufficiently angry that he
might lose his self-control-at common law. Indeed, this case
falls so short of adequate provocation that it would almost certainly not present a jury issue in a traditional non-MPC jurisdiction. Under the MPC, or at least the New York Court of Appeals' understanding of the provision, 124 however, once there is
119. See infra Part V. B.
120. 404 N.E.2d 1310 (N.Y. 1980).

121. Id. at 1312.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1316-17.
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a finding of EMED 125 the fact finder must be given the opportunity to determine whether the defendant had a reasonable
explanation or excuse for the EMED.
Should this type of case go the jury? Perhaps so, but not as
a provocation case.1 26 Here is where the MPC approach confuses. Defense counsel presented only one witness to explain
the defendant's "bizarre"--that word should alert observers to
the fact that this is not really a provocation case-behavior,
namely, a psychiatrist "who testified, in essence, that the defendant had become obsessed with [the decedent] and that the
course which their relationship had taken, combined with several personality attributes peculiar to defendant, caused him to
be under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance at the
time of the killing." 127
The italicized words of the testimony-testimony of a psychiatrist!-tell us that if Casassa deserved to have his culpability mitigated, it was not because he was "adequately provoked,"
i.e., his emotional state was not one that a reasonable person
would have experienced, but rather because he suffered from
"peculiar" personality attributes that might justify mitigating
the offense. This is where the Code's Commentary remark"[iun the end, the question is whether the actor's loss of selfcontrol can be understood in terms that arouse sympathy in the
ordinary citizen" 12 8-- comes into play. Perhaps because of
Casassa's unfortunate mental condition, he could not control
himself like an ordinary person and, therefore, is less culpable
than the ordinary intentional killer, but this is not in any useful sense a provocation case. Critics of the doctrine, in other
words, should not see Casassa or its ilk as a cause c6l~bre.
Many EMED cases are really diminished-capacity cases disguised in heat-of-passion garb.
I fear the Code's decision to collapse provocation and diminished capacity into one EMED defense ultimately may
dis125. The New York manslaughter statute, N.Y. PEN. LAW § 125.20(2)
(McKinney 1998), uses the term "extreme emotional disturbance" (EED)-the
word "mental" is omitted-but this difference does not affect the analysis.
126. Furthermore, perhaps even some New York courts agree that EMED
cases should not always go to the jury. E.g., People v. Walker, 473 N.Y.S.2d
460, 461-62 (1984) (affirming, over a dissent, a trial judge's refusal to instruct
the jury on manslaughter where W, an illegal narcotics dealer, killed his supplier in a restaurant after an argument about a prior deal, and sought to claim
EMED).
127. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d at 1313 (emphasis added).
128. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.3, at 63.
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serve both doctrines. It expands the former doctrine beyond
reasonable lines and, to the extent that people see cases like
Casassa as permitting provocation claims of this sort to go to
the jury, unnecessarily brings the heat-of-passion defense into
disrepute. At the same time, a defense lawyer who focuses too
much on Casassa-like external "provocations" and too little on
psychiatric testimony of the defendant's impaired self-control
mechanisms or cognitive capacities is likely to weaken her client's diminished capacity claim. And in a jurisdiction that
wishes to retain the provocation defense but (I think unwisely)
repeal the diminished capacity doctrine, a Casassa-type case
might be improperly resolved.
One other weakness in the EMED formula deserves attention within the context of the provocation doctrine: The manslaughter provision does not require that the EMED be the result of provocation in the sense of any triggering act by the
decedent or another that acts upon the defendant. For example, if Donald becomes enraged at the sight of Elmer and kills
him, and later claims that his EMED was the result of the fact
that Elmer reminded him of his despised brother Frank, Donald is entitled to have the jury consider his mitigation claim despite the absence of any provocation.12 9
Again, this omission is understandable in view of the diminished capacity overtones of the doctrine, but is undesirable
from a heat-of-passion perspective. The requirement of some
provocation-insulting words, an unwanted physical touching,
adulterous behavior, or even the September 11 attack on the
country-focuses the jury's attention where it belongs in a
provocation case, namely, on some triggering event that potentially "justifies" or "excuses" the defendant's anger (something
that either makes us feel that anger is appropriate or, at least,
understandable), which in turn explains the actor's loss of selfcontrol.
Based on these observations, then, I would conclude that
the EMED formula crafted by the American Law Institute is
flawed, but includes positive features. I next consider the most
important feature of the MPC manslaughter provision, namely,
its more subjectivist cast.
129. See State v. Elliott, 411 A.2d 3, 7-8 (Conn. 1979) (holding that no provoking or triggering event is required under the EMED formula and therefore
overturning a murder conviction because the jury was not permitted to consider a manslaughter claim where E, who had for years feared his brother,
killed his brother for no apparent reason).
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B. SUBJECTIVIZING THE DOCTRINE: THE MODEL PENAL CODE
The Code begins objectively: There must be a "reasonable
explanation or excuse" for the defendant's EMED. It qualifies
this standard, however, by providing that the reasonableness of
the explanation or excuse be determined "from the viewpoint of
a person in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he
believes them to be." 130 The Commentary states that the
phrase "under the circumstances as he believes them to be" is
meant to clarify the role of mistake in provocation law. Thus, if
a person "reasonably but mistakenly identifies his wife's rapist
and kills the wrong person[, he] may be eligible for mitigation if
his extreme emotional disturbance were otherwise subject to
131
reasonable explanation or excuse."
This aspect of the EMED provision is desirable because it
rejects the justification-based "misdirected retaliation" rule.
This same language, however, opens the door to much bigger
issues. Consider the following Racist or Mixed Up Father Hypothetical:
Arnold is the father of a seventeen-year-old daughter, Betty, whom he
loves dearly. Arnold has never committed an act of violence toward
any person, of any race, in the past. Nor does he generally favor such
activities. However, Arnold believes that African-American males
possess an invisible germ that can kill non-African-Americans with
whom they have skin-to-skin contact. Arnold observes Betty talking
to Carl, an African-American friend. Carl is touching Betty's hand.
Arnold, fearful for his daughter's life, tells Carl to let go of his daughter's hand. Carl does so, looks at Arnold in bewilderment, and says to
Betty, "What in the world is bothering your father?" Powerfully enraged by Carl's lack of concern for his daughter's safety, Arnold stabs
Carl to death.

Does Arnold have an EMED claim, and should he? According to Casassa, upon adequate proof that the defendant suffered from an EMED at the time of the homicide, the issue of
whether there is a reasonable explanation or excuse for his
condition must be left to the fact finder. So, this case would go
to the jury. The reasonableness of Arnold's rage, however,
must be considered by the jury "from the viewpoint of a person
in the actor's situation under the circumstances as he believes
them to be." Here the italicized language requires the jury to
look at Arnold's emotional state from the bizarre perspective of
one who believes that black men spread deadly germs and,
therefore, that Carl endangered Arnold's daughter's life. Seen
130. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(l)(b) (1962).
131. MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.3, at 62.
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this way, Arnold not only has a viable jury issue, but very possibly a winning argument for mitigation.
How do we feel about this? Perhaps we should ask ourselves why Arnold thinks this way. One possibility is that he
suffers from clinical paranoia and should be seen as bringing a
diminished capacity, as opposed to a provocation, claim. That
makes sense, and would allow a jury to mitigate his crime on
grounds that do not require it to make sense of his anger. Yet,
some would look at these facts and draw the conclusion that
Arnold is simply a racist, no more and no less. 132 If so, a diminished capacity claim seemingly drops out, which forces us to reconsider what the Code would have us do with him.
I am not entirely sure how the Code intends to deal with
Arnold's case in a non-diminished capacity context. The Commentary explains that the word "situation" in the phrase "from
the viewpoint of a person in the actor's situation" is "designedly
ambiguous." 133 According to the Commentary, this term is
meant to allow a jury to consider a defendant's "personal
handicaps and some external circumstances," but there are limits to subjectivization: It is "equally plain that idiosyncratic
moral values"--the Commentary gives an example of an assassin who kills a political leader because he believes it is right to
do so--"are not part of the actor's situation. An assassin...
cannot ask that he be judged by the standard of a reasonable
extremist. Any other result would undermine the normative
message of the criminal law." 134 The Commentary concedes
that there are many cases between these extremes"matters... [not] as integral a part of moral depravity as a belief in the rightness of killing"'13 5-that are better left to common law resolution. The bottom line is the already-quoted observation that "in the end, the question is whether the actor's
loss of self-control can be understood in terms that arouse sympathy in the ordinary citizen." 13 6 Thus, it seems, the middle
cases may go to the jury.
Assuming we characterize Arnold as a racist, 137 is this a
"middle case" that should be sent to the jury to consider the
132. Of course, his racism could be the result of clinical paranoia, which
brings us conceptually back to a diminished capacity claim.
133.

MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 210.3, at 62.

134.
135.
136.
137.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 63.
But see infra text accompanying note 142.
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situation from his viewpoint, or are we dealing now with an
"idiosyncratic moral value"? At first, one would want to put
Arnold in the assassin category. Isn't "reasonable racist" a virtual oxymoron, at least if "reasonable" means empirically accurate?138 If so, and if racists are placed in the same category as
assassins (or, in today's mental processes, terrorists), there is a
conflict between this interpretation of the Code (which results
in excluding Arnold's explanation for his EMED) and the interpretation above that seems to require us to look at factual circumstances from the actor's faulty perspective-that Arnold
genuinely believes that Carl was spreading a deadly germ to
his daughter.
But wait: The Commentary seems to exclude the assassin
from protection because of his "belief in the rightness of killing." That is, the drafters may be thinking here of a person,
like perhaps a contract killer, who simply believes that killing
people, like swatting flies, is morally acceptable. If this is the
point of the Commentary, Arnold is not equivalent to an assassin. Arnold does not equate killing people to swatting flies. His
goal here-his reason for killing Carl-is not an idiosyncratic
one if we tell the story his way: It is to protect a life he values
from a threat he (mistakenly) perceives. Thus, we might be
back to taking Arnold's bizarre beliefs into play, and letting the
jury decide whether they feel sympathy for him, despite his racial thought processes.
This may be the Code's solution, on the ground that Arnold
does not hold to a belief that, if incorporated into the objective
standard, expressly contradicts the normative anti-violence
message of the criminal law. Racism, however, violates critical
community norms, and a rule that a defendant who kills someone may then use his racist views to mitigate his offense (because he has a "reasonable" explanation for his anger) seemingly undermines criminal law norms-thus, the puzzle.
Let us put Arnold aside for a moment and consider a different case, this one from Australia: 139 Stewart, a member of
an Aboriginal tribe, spoke about tribal secrets in the presence
138. See Jody D. Armour, Race Ipsa Loquitur: Of ReasonableRacists, Intelligent Bayesians, and Involuntary Negrophobes, 46 STAN. L. REV. 781, 788
(1994).
139. Robert L. Misner, The Awkward Case of Harry Gibson, 1986 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 691 (discussing Regina v. Gibson, an unreported case decided by the Supreme Court of South Australia (1973) (on file with the Arizona State Law
Journal)).
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of women and young men, in violation of tribal norms. Another
tribesman, Gibson, unsuccessfully sought to stop Stewart from
violating the norm and, when he failed to do so, killed Stewart.
0
Gibson was tried before a jury of non-Aboriginals.14
Notice that Gibson does not claim a mistake of fact as Arnold did, but rather wants to bring to the jury's attention a culturally-based value system that presumably conflicts with the
jury's belief system, but which will explain his otherwise inexplicable outrage. What is the Model Penal Code approach to
the case? As I read the Code and Commentary, a judge would
have to decide whether Gibson possessed an "idiosyncratic
moral value." In the absence of such a finding, this case would
go to the jury, which would be asked to consider the reasonableness of Gibson's anger from the perspective of one who lives
in and accepts the Aboriginal culture.
Of course, in deciding whether Gibson possesses "idiosyncratic moral values," we put ourselves right in the middle of
great battles being waged about the values (or lack thereof) of
multiculturalism, and how the law should handle the sometimes conflicting goals of multiculturalism and other important
societal concerns.14 1 Do we see the Gibson case as involving
simply a different moral or religious value system deserving of
sufficient respect that the jurors should try, as best possible, to
put themselves in Gibson's shoes, or do we characterize this as
a patriarchal or sexist value system undeserving of legal protection in the EMED formula? Again, if the drafters of the
MPC only meant by "idiosyncratic moral values" those values
that place a low value on human life, Gibson seems entitled to
his chance before a jury.

140. Id. at 691.
141. E.g., Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through
Multiculturalism: The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1097
(1996) (advocating that the law deal with the conflict by balancing "the Defendant's interest in using cultural evidence that incorporates discriminatory
norms and behaviors" and the "victims' interests in obtaining protection and
relief through a non-discriminatory application of the criminal law"); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Points Against Postmodernism, 75 CH.-KENT L. REV.
687, 694-700 (2000) (discussing the postmodern "multicultural defense for
male violence"); Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are
Feminist and Multiculturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal

Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 36, 37-38 (1995) (dicussing whether attempts to
increase 'judicial responsiveness to claims of pluralism raised by defendants
who are not part of the dominant culture" conflicts with attempts to increase
"the court's vigor in prosecuting crimes of family and anti-woman violence").
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C. SUBJECTIVIZING THE DOCTRINE: MY OWN THOUGHTS

Once I shift from the MPC's ambiguous solution to these
issues to my own approach, I concede that I am also unsure of
precisely where I want to draw the lines in specific cases, but
lines there must be. The first line I would draw would be based
on what I will call the "oxymoron principle." That is, the concept of reasonableness that inheres in the provocation doctrine
cannot be so flexible as to permit incorporation of an attribute
or belief of the provoked actor that would force us to describe
the "reasonable person" in near oxymoronic terms. One cannot
be a "reasonable paranoid," for example. If the defendant is
paranoid, his claim should be that of diminished capacity; he is
not entitled to ask us to see the world, and thus understand his
reasons for feeling angry, from the perspective of a paranoid
person.
Where does this take us, for example, with father Arnold if
we characterize him as a racist? The understandable tendency
when we characterize a person this way is to consider him unreasonable. Therefore, we refuse to consider a claimed provocation from the actor's "unreasonable" (e.g., racist) perspective. 142
In one sense, Arnold is a racist: He generalizes about people (at
least on one matter) by race; that generalization is a negative
one in that he considers a whole category of people, AfricanAmerican males, dangerous to another race of people. Yet, in
the story I have told he wants no harm to come to AfricanAmericans simply because of their race (although one would
assume he would want to live in some version of apartheid).
On a racism continuum, if you will, Arnold's version is surely
less malignant than that of one who favors genocide. Indeed,
assume for a moment that Arnold not only holds the ignorant
ideas already ascribed to him, but that he also believes that
white people carry lethal germs that will kill non-whites if there
is skin contact. This does not make Arnold any less racist in
the sense described above, and he is now even more ignorant

142. An initial observation: We should hesitate before characterizing someone as, for example, "a racist" or "an anti-Semite," even though such people
obviously exist. To label someone this way is to harshly judge that person's
character. A little humility on our part regarding our capacity for judging
others-and regarding our standing to do so-is not a bad thing, especially
when we are talking about punishing people in our name. See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Epistemology, the Retributive Emotions, and the "Clumsy Moral
Philosophy" of Jesus Christ, in THE PASSIONS OF LAW 149, 157 (Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999).
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than in the original hypothetical, but this additional information may make us now think of Arnold less as a malignancy
than as a pathetically ignorant or confused (and dangerous)
person. He does not possess idiosyncratic moral views as much
as he possesses "idiosyncratic"-no, let's call it "amazingly stupid"-ideas about disease production.
In Model Penal Code terms, I would not characterize Arnold as one who possesses idiosyncratic moral views. He is not
like the assassin or terrorist or Ku Klux Klanner who espouses
the justifiability of killing innocent persons on the basis of race.
At the same time, I submit it is unacceptable to ask a jury to
see the world as Arnold believes it exists-that everyone is
running around with lethal germs that will kill people of another race if they touch-and then for the jury to determine if
he has a "reasonableexplanation or excuse" for his anger, or in
common law terms, to determine whether a "reasonableperson"
with those views would become so angry that he might lose
self-control. Although there will always be line-drawing problems in this regard, I have no trouble concluding that incorporating Arnold's belief system in the "reasonable person" violates the oxymoron principle, not because Arnold is a racist, but
simply because he is holding on to patently unreasonable ideas
that are verifiably false. 143 For me, if Arnold's actions are mitigated to manslaughter it is because his beliefs are a symptom
of something much deeper within his psyche that has affected
his capacity for rationality, if not his self-control. This is not a
legitimate provocation case in my mind; it is (if at all) a diminished capacity claim. 144

143. Arnold's mistake is unlike the mistake the drafters of the EMED formula had in mind, e.g., a defendant who looks for his wife's rapist and mistakenly kills an innocent person. A person can make a mistake regarding the
identity of a rapist and still be a "reasonable person"; Arnold's errors render
him unreasonable.
144. Defenders of the Code might respond to me as follows: "By collapsing
two defenses into one, the Code does us a service. If we can agree that Arnold's case should end up with the jury somehow, why care which theory gets
us there?" As I have said earlier, if one wants to abandon provocation and diminished capacity in favor of a generic partial defense, this comment may be
right (although I might want to redraft the partial excuse, see supra note 114).
My purpose here, however, is to try to show why a jurisdiction that wants to
retain the provocation doctrine, as such, should handle such cases. And, to the
extent that a jurisdiction also wants to make room for a diminished capacity
claim, it is better for lawyers to see what it is they are really arguing, and for
jurors to have a clearer idea of what moral statement a verdict to mitigate is
making (and not making).
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The Aboriginal case is a different matter, as Gibson does
not claim any mistake of fact, but rather acted within a different cultural framework. Here, as I see it, we must decide if allowing him to explain his reason for his anger on the basis of a
belief system foreign to the jury would violate the anti-violence
norms of the criminal law.
Cultural differences can be minor or quite substantial. If I
were a judge and had the requisite authority, I would send the
Gibson case to the jury for its consideration. I would do so for
two reasons. First, there is nothing from these facts that suggests that Aboriginals value human life less than nonAboriginals. And, in a society that values free thought, a judge
representing the law and authority should be exceedingly hesitant to characterize a moral value or cultural belief as beyond
the pale and, as a result, deny the defendant the opportunity to
make his claim to the jury. Second, we need to trust in juries
for the reasons I have already expressed. 145 In the Gibson case
I would take it that a jury would not consider his anger appropriate-even in a society that values multiculturalism, the
dominant culture is not required to accept the values of another
community-but it might (or might not) find his anger excusable, and it might (or might not) find his degree of anger sufficiently understandable in this context that it is prepared to say
that a person in that condition would likely find it exceedingly
difficult to control himself.
Consider instead the following case: A generally mildmannered person, call him Guest, thinks abortion is murder.
Guest is invited with his wife to a new neighbor's home, call
him Host, for dinner. Host turns out to be a doctor who works
at a local abortion clinic. Upon learning this, Guest begins to
leave, but his wife gently convinces him to be sociable and stay.
Host continues to talk about the abortions in a way that strikes
Guest as callous. Enraged at hearing Host speak so calmly
about what Guest considers genocide, Guest loses self-control
and strangles Host. 146
I would consider this a jury issue on provocation. Guest is
a mild-mannered person. He does not espouse the moral view
that abortionists should be murdered; he is not claiming he did
the right thing in killing Host. He simply became immensely
angry because, based on his moral belief that fetuses are hu145. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
146. Herbert Morris suggested this hypothetical to me.

2002]

THE PROVOCATION DEFENSE

man beings, he was listening to a "murderer" describe his "serial crimes" without remorse.
In my view fetuses are not human beings. Nonetheless,
the idea that they are (or are not) cannot be empirically verified, because the concept of "human being-ness" is a philosophical, moral, and religious issue about which there is considerable dispute among philosophers, ethicists, and religious
scholars. Since one is surely entitled in our society to hold the
moral or religious view that fetuses are humans, the law can
hardly deny that a person possessing such views would (or even
should) become enraged upon listening to a doctor describe his
repeated actions of killing "human beings." Guest's rage, therefore, is as understandable given his beliefs as Host's would be if
he were listening to a "pro-lifer" explain how he goes about methodically killing abortion providers. As a juror, I would probably not partially excuse the homicides in either case, but I still
consider these jury cases.
I would reserve the limiting judicial role, as the MPC does,
to cases in which the defendant's belief system unmistakably
violates the anti-violence norms of the criminal law, for example, assassins, terrorists, and violence-justifying racists. There
will be precious few of these circumstances because most of the
extreme cases will already be excluded by the oxymoron principle and/or would properly fall on the diminished capacity side
of the line.
D. MY PROPOSAL
I have noted certain flaws in the Model Penal Code manslaughter provision. Despite my criticisms, the Code's overall
effort strikes me as positive. Nonetheless, particularly for
those who prefer (as I do) to separate diminished capacity from
provocation, a somewhat different form of the defense is appropriate.
In this regard, the English Homicide Act of 1957 is a good
starting point for thinking about a specific heat-of-passion defense:
Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can
find that the person charged was provoked (whether by things done or
things said or by both together) to lose his self-control, the question
whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as
he did shall be left to be determined by the jury; and in determining
that question the jury shall take into account everything both done
and said according to the effect which, in their opinion, it would have

998

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
on a reasonable man.

[Vol.86:959

147

This statute differs from the MPC in various ways: It very
clearly is a provocation defense and expressly focuses on the actor's loss of self-control (a virtue); it requires some provocative
event that triggers the loss of self-control (a virtue); and the
statute does not on its face invite subjectivization (a mixed
blessing). 148 It is similar to the MPC in various regards: It
abandons the common law categories of adequate provocation
and permits words alone to qualify as adequate provocation (a
virtue); and it leaves the question of the adequacy of the provocation to juries (generally good).
I am not entirely satisfied with the language of the statute.
The ultimate issue should not be whether "the provocation was
enough to make a reasonable man do as he did," 149 because
"reasonable men" do not kill others when provoked, least of all
in the ultra-violent way provoked killers often do it. Instead,
the issue should be articulated as follows: Whether the provocation "might render ordinary [persons], of fair average disposition, liable to act rashly or without due deliberation or reflection, and from passion, rather than judgment." 150
This
language keeps the focus where it belongs: on whether the defendant's loss of self-control is something that a reasonable or
ordinary person might experience, and not whether there is a
reasonable explanation or excuse for the homicide itself.151
My proposed statute (or, alternatively, jury instruction)
152
would read as follows:
A killing that would otherwise constitute murder constitutes the affirmative defense of manslaughter if the killing occurs as the result of
an apparent provocation, whether by things done or things said or by
both together, that might 153 cause a reasonable [ordinary 154 ] person,

147. Homicide Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 11, § 3 (Eng.).
148. Though not subjective on its face, the House of Lords has interpreted
the statute to permit widespread subjectivization. E.g., Regina v. Smith, 1
A.C. 146, 155-56 (H.L. 2001) (Lord Slynn of Hadley, arguing that the particular characteristics of the accused be taken into account in the determination of
a reasonable person); Dir. of Pub. Pros. v. Camplin, A.C. 705, 716-18 (H.L.
1978) (Lord Diplock, stating that the jury is entitled to use evidence of the defendant's characteristics in determining the reasonable person).
149. Homicide Act, 1957, § 3.
150.

Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 219 (1862).

151. People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310, 1316 n.2 (N.Y. 1980).
152. I previously drafted a proposed manslaughter statute. Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion, supra note 1, at 468. Upon twenty years of reflection, I have substantially redrafted it.
153. I use the word "might" rather than "would." If a provocation would
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of average disposition, to lose self-control and act rashly and without
due deliberation; in making this determination, the fact finder shall
take into account everything both done and said according to the effect which, in its opinion, it would have on a reasonable [ordinary]
person in the actor's situation, according to the factual circumstances
as such person would believe them to be.

As drafted, the statute or jury instruction treats manslaughter as an affirmative defense. As such, a legislature
could constitutionally allocate the burden of persuasion in regard to the defense to the defendant.1 55
The doctrine, as drafted, requires some external event
(thus, the requirement of "things done or said"), but it need
only be an apparentprovocation. Thus, the defense potentially
applies to a situation in which no provocation occurred, al156
though one appearedby words or actions to have taken place.
For example, a defendant who incorrectly believes (from another's words or actions) that one's spouse committed adultery
may claim the defense, as long as his belief that adultery occurred is based on "factual circumstances" as a reasonable person "would believe them to be." In short, provocation may 157
be
based on a reasonable mistake of fact that adultery occurred.
As I favor some subjectivization of the "reasonable person"
test, I have chosen to use the MPC language "in the actor's
situation," 158 with its designed ambiguity. I have already set
out what I consider to be appropriate limits on the subjectivization of the objective standard, 159 but a few other points deserve
attention here. In considering which characteristic may properly be incorporated, I submit it is useful to distinguish between characteristics of the defendant that assess the level of
self-control to be expected of the reasonable person and those
that measure the gravity of the provocation to the "reasonable
cause a reasonable/ordinary person to lose self-control, a full excuse seemingly
would be justifiable. See id.
154. See supra note 65.
155. See Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1977).
156. The defense would not apply to a case in which the defendant kills, for
example, because the decedent's mere looks reminded him of his enemy, see
supra note 129 and accompanying text, although a diminished capacity doctrine might well apply there.
157. The defense may also be claimed if adultery did occur but the defendant mistakenly killed the wrong person, e.g., the adulterer's twin, as long as
he acted on the basis of factual circumstances that would cause a reasonable
(or ordinary) person to be mistaken as to the wrongdoer.
158. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1)(b) (1962).
159. See supra Part V.C.
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man. 1 60 Thus, the objective standard excludes a defendant's
short-temperedness, for if it did not, pugnacious persons would
be treated more leniently than longer-tempered persons. Likewise, any other characteristic of the defendant (e.g., that he is
drunk at the time of the provocation 61 ) that provides him with
less-than-ordinary capacity for self-control must be excluded
from the standard.
In contrast, characteristics of the defendant (other than
those excluded pursuant to the oxymoron principle or which
would undermine the normative message of the criminal law)
that would help the jury measure the gravity of the provocation
to the defendant ought to be incorporated. Thus, Gibson's cultural beliefs in the Aboriginal case 162 would be considered by
the jury, as would the race of the defendant if, for example, the
decedent's words or actions would inflame a person of that race
to a greater extent than others.
Finally, I have slightly rephrased the MPC language ("under the circumstances as he believes them to be"' 63 becomes
"under the factual circumstances as such person believes them
to be"), in order to deal with Racist or Mixed Up Father Hypothetical. If I am right that the MPC language might require
the jury to consider the facts in that case from Arnold's perspective, including his mistaken belief about germs, the revised
language will hopefully avoid this unfortunate outcome. The
words "such person" refer to the "reasonable [or ordinary] person in the actor's situation" and not to the defendant; thus, only
those mistakes of fact by the defendant that might also be imputed to a reasonable person would be considered by the jury.
Thus, in Arnold's case, a provocation claim does not lie.
So, to summarize: Provocation should be a defense, based
on a partial excuse theory, separate from the diminished capacity doctrine. Contrary to Professor Nourse's suggestion, the required provocation need not constitute a criminal act that society punishes; indeed, any actions or words can potentially
qualify. The defense must navigate a fine line between subjectivism and objectivism. As I have shown, Arnold the father
160. See Jonathan Herring, Provocationand Ethnicity, 1996 CRIM.L. REV.
490, 490. But see Regina v. Smith, 1 A.C. 146 (H.L. 2001) (rejecting the distinction set out in the text between gravity of provocation and powers of self
control).
161. See, e.g., Regina v. Newell, 71 Crim. App. R.331, 339-40 (1980).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 139-41.
163. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3 (1)(b) (1962).
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would not have a provocation claim, but Gibson the Aboriginal,
Guest the pro-lifer and Host the pro-choicer would have the
right to have their cases heard by the jury, even though we
know that juries sometimes reach results that do not please
US.164

On the other hand, the defendant has the burden of producing evidence sufficient to bring the defense into play. The
jury is the best institution to evaluate provocation claims, but
contrary to the MPC and the English Homicide Act, not all
provocation claims merit a jury hearing. Jurisdictions vary on
how much evidence is required for any affirmative defense to go
to the jury:
.some evidence," "more than a scintilla," "slight evidence,"... "evidence
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt," "evidence that would justify a
reasonable jury in finding the existence or non-existence of the fact,"
and evidence that would allow a rational factfinder to conclude "there is
165
a sufficiently high probability that the relevant issue will be proved."

The provocation defense should be treated no differently in this
regard than other affirmative claims.
CONCLUSION
I stated at the outset that provocation law raises difficult
and troubling issues. Although I do not believe that the defense is intended to justify or excuse domestic violence, it
undeniably permits some violent men to avoid the harshest
punishment available for their crimes. One ought to feel disquiet at this fact whether one is a critic of the defense or its defender. Nonetheless, the provocation defense plays an important role in homicide law. Particularly with serious felonies
like criminal homicide, the law is well-served by partial excuses
that permit juries to finely tune levels of criminal responsibility
on the basis of differential culpability. As long as people get
angry and that anger affects their capacity for self-control,
there will be a need for a partial legal excuse that recognizes
the fact that even people who possess normal levels of selfcontrol sometimes "lose it."
Feminist criticisms of the provocation doctrine in the
164. Lest we forget it, judges live in the same world as jurors, and therefore, are not entirely immune from the same prejudices and biases that infect
the community as a whole. See Joshua Dressier, JudicialHomophobia: Gay
Rights'BiggestRoadblock, 5 C.L. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1979, at 19.
165. 1 PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 4(c), at 35-36
(1984).
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United States focus most particularly on the Model Penal Code
version of the defense. I have shown that some of the cases
that fall under the "extreme mental or emotional disturbance"
umbrella are not really provocation cases at all. My proposed
version of the defense would move the law away from the latter
formula, but there is no denying that my approach-indeed any
reformulation that does not carve out special rules for domestic
violence cases-will result in female-unfriendly outcomes as
long as males, more often than females, externalize their anger
when provoked. This fact should not cause us to forget that
provoked killers do not avoid convictions for their actions: Even
if the defense applies, which it does not in all cases, and even if
the jury accepts the defense, which it does not in all cases, the
defendant is convicted of manslaughter.
Manslaughter is not a trivial offense. Manslaughterers do
not avoid significant societal condemnation and they can receive significant punishment for their offense. 16 6 It is wrong,
however, to stigmatize, condemn and punish a person to the extent that we do a murderer simply because that individual only
lives up to the standard of the ordinary law-abiding but imperfect person in similar circumstances. We may want people to
be better than they are, but the criminal law is not meant to
make people virtuous or punish them for being less than that.
The provocation defense is centuries old. It should not be
abolished.

166. See supra note 8.

